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Abstract
Inequality of opportunity strikes when two children with the same academic
performance are sent to different quality schools because their parents differ in
socio-economic status. Based on a novel dataset for Germany, we demonstrate
that children are significantly less likely to enter the academic track if they
come from low socio-economic status (SES) families, even after conditioning
on prior measures of school performance. We then provide causal evidence
that a low-intensity mentoring program can improve long-run education out-
comes of low SES children and reduce inequality of opportunity. Low SES
children, who were randomly assigned to a mentor for one year are 20 per-
cent more likely to enter a high track program. The mentoring relationship
affects both parents and children and has positive long-term implications for
children’s educational trajectories.
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1 Introduction
Rising inequalities are a major political concern in many Western societies. An
important cause, and manifestation, of societal inequality is unequal access to high
quality education and its subsequent consequences. In this paper, we therefore ask
whether childhood intervention programs such as mentoring can improve educational
outcomes for disadvantaged children, and thereby abate educational disparities. We
provide an affirmative, causal answer to this question, adding to a growing literature
showing that early childhood interventions can effectively level the playing field and
reduce inequalities (e.g., Currie, 2001; Garces et al., 2002; Heckman et al., 2013;
Kautz et al., 2014; Fryer et al., 2015; List et al., 2018; Cappelen et al., 2020).
A particularly explicit form of differential access to education is early tracking,
a feature that is present in many educational systems. For example, among the 36
OECD countries, 34 have a tracking system whereby children at various ages are
selected into more or less academic school types (see table A1).1 Different tracks
are typically associated with varying levels of educational quality and predictive of
life outcomes.2 Being enrolled in a “lower” track often implies lower teacher quality,
fewer total hours of instruction, less academic subjects being taught, fewer high-
potential peer groups and generally a lower probability to qualify for high-skilled
jobs, compared to being enrolled in “higher” tracks. Given the economic and social
importance of tracking, the selection process into different tracks imparts informa-
tion about a society’s level of equality of opportunity: Selection can be primarily
based on merits such as performance, achievement and motivation. In contrast, in
less equal societies, selection is significantly determined by socio-economic status
and parental background, i.e., features beyond an individual’s control. In the latter
case, the educational system may actually enlarge pre-existing inequalities, rather
than reducing them.
In the following, we study inequality implications of the tracking process in the
context of the German school system, where tracking takes place after elementary
school, i.e., at around age 10.3 We first explore to what extent selection into aca-
1We use the term tracking for school systems in which students are bifurcated into different
schools, with either a vocational or academic emphasis. Our main focus thus differs from within
school classroom allocation based on achievement as seen in the United States or Canada (see
Betts, 2011, for a discussion).
2E.g., Hanushek and Wössmann (2006) show that tracking increases educational inequality. Fig-
ures A1 and A2 in the Appendix show large and lasting differences regarding health and happiness
between graduates from different school tracks in Germany.
3The German context is particularly interesting to study tracking, as it combines largely public
and tuition-free schools and universities with restrictive early tracking. There are few financial
constraints to prevent students from obtaining university education but entering university requires
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demic (high) or vocational (low) track programs reflects merit versus socio-economic
status (SES) and parental background. Building on these findings, we then ask the
question whether and how a randomized childhood intervention can reduce observed
inequalities and help improve equality of opportunity.
Our data come from the briq family panel (bfp) (for an overview see Falk and
Kosse, 2020), which combines comprehensive yearly interviews of children and their
families with a randomized intervention in form of a one-to-one mentoring program
implemented at the start of the panel in 2011. The panel consists of more than 700
high and low SES families with children born between September 2002 and August
2004. Participation in the mentoring program was randomly assigned among chil-
dren from low SES families. The mentoring program is a well-established nonprofit
program called Balu und Du (German for “Baloo and You”). It provides children
with a volunteer mentor, typically a university student, for the duration of one year.
Conceptually, the program endeavors to extend a child’s horizons and foster the
acquisition of new skills and experiences through social interactions between mentor
and child. Before and after the intervention, as well as in several follow-up data col-
lections, children and their parents were interviewed by trained interviewers. The
dataset includes not only detailed schooling-related information such as grades and
attended school track, but also information regarding the tracking-related decision-
making process, allowing us to zoom in on the mechanisms of this process.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We first document that a
child’s socio-economic background is an important determinant of track selection,
i.e., inequalities in opportunity arise from early tracking. In particular, children
from high SES families are significantly more likely to attend the high track than
children from low SES backgrounds. The respective conditional SES gap amounts
to 31.1 percentage points, and is significant at any conventional level. Relative to
a baseline probability of 48.8 percent of attending the high track among low SES
children, this is a sizable effect. One could argue that this unconditional, raw ef-
fect overstates the extent to which SES differences reflect inequality of opportunity,
simply because some differences may arise in response to different levels of effort
or motivation rather than parental background. For instance, if low SES students
work less hard, achievement gaps do not necessarily reflect inequality of opportu-
nity, but differences in work effort. We therefore also study the “conditional” gap,
which describes SES-differences conditional on GPA in elementary school as well
as sex and age. This way, the conditional gap expresses any differences that arise
graduation from the academic high school track. Tracking after elementary school is thus a critical
junction in children’s educational careers.
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from SES differences after netting out performance differences. Note that while
the unconditional gap possibly overstates inequality of opportunity, the conditional
gap understates it if school performance itself is determined by SES differences, e.g.
through children’s differential access to high-quality learning environments. As ex-
pected, the conditional SES gap is smaller than the unconditional effect but with
21.7 percentage points still sizable, and significant at any conventional level. In
other words, even conditional on GPA, sex and age, children from low SES back-
grounds are significantly less likely to enter the high track. In fact, accounting for
performance differences explains less than one third of the unconditional gap in high
track attendance. Moreover, the track selection pattern turns out to be very stable
over time. Five to six years after tracking took place, both gaps, the conditional as
well as the unconditional, remain present and even slightly increased. The apparent
irreversibility of track choice further underscores the importance of early tracking.
Building on our first result, our main interest concerns the question whether
childhood intervention programs can help reduce the SES gap in early tracking.
For that matter, we compare tracking outcomes of untreated and treated low SES
children. The latter were randomly assigned to the mentoring program in grades two
or three, that is, one to two years prior to the point of tracking. We hypothesized
that participation in the mentoring program can affect tracking decisions for various
reasons. First, the mentoring program stimulates so-called informal learning, i.e., it
is meant to support children in their psycho-social development by widening horizons
and fostering self-confidence. As a consequence, treated children might become more
motivated and confident in the school context. If so, teachers who spend four years
with their students and know them well should attest that treated children have
a higher potential for a successful high track career in comparison to untreated
children. Second, mentors are important role models (Rhodes et al., 2000; Kosse
et al., 2020). In the given context, this is of particular importance because all
mentors have completed the high track in school and were enrolled at some college
or university. Thereby, the mentor as a role model introduces the notion of high track
attendance, and higher education in general, to a family context that is often rather
unfamiliar with these concepts. It is therefore likely that children are motivated
and encouraged to “imitate” the mentor. In addition, parents are made familiar
with high track education and mentors may directly or indirectly motivate parents
to consider a high track education for their children.4 In sum, we expect a positive
effect of mentoring on the likelihood of entering high track education. In terms of
4See, e.g., Goodman et al. (2019) for a related mechanism, i.e., regarding sibling spillovers in
college enrollment.
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measures, we further expect that treated children are more likely to receive high
track recommendations (child effect) and that parents are more likely to overrule a
low track recommendation (parental effect).
Our results confirm these hypotheses. Most importantly, we find a positive
causal effect of mentoring on high track attendance among low SES students. The
effect amounts to 11 percentage points (p < 0.05), i.e., the mentoring intervention
closes about one third of the unconditional SES gap. In terms of the conditional
difference (accounting for GPA, sex and age), the gap is even reduced by roughly
one half. Importantly, the positive effect of mentoring is not short-lived but remains
virtually unchanged five to six years after the tracking decision had taken place.
The enduring nature of the treatment effect is informative also for the question
whether the treatment effect pushed the “wrong” children into the high track. Are
children who would have been better off in the low track now urged to enter the
high track, with negative consequences? This seems not to be the case. First, we
do not observe treatment specific reversals of the tracking decision, nor increases
in grade retention. Moreover, we find no differences between treatment and control
when asking about school enjoyment. In terms of mechanisms, we find support for
both a child and a parental effect. As hypothesized, treated children are more likely
to receive high track recommendations and parents of treated children turn out to
overrule low track recommendations more often than parents without treatment.
The latter finding is particularly interesting as it shows that mentoring can affect
household decision-making above and beyond immediate effects on the child. From
a political perspective, these effects are promising in particular as the program seems
easily scalable and highly cost effective.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, by showing that educa-
tional segregation tends to reinforce socioeconomic inequalities, this study speaks
to work on the implications of educational sorting. Proponents of tracking point
towards efficiency gains in the educational process due to targeted instruction or
peer effects (Betts, 2011) with potential positive learning effects in particular for
high ability students (Duflo et al., 2011; Card and Giuliano, 2016; Fu and Mehta,
2018).5 At the same time, as confirmed in our paper, early tracking can lead to
mismatch and inequalities of opportunity. While some studies find no adverse long-
term consequences of coincidental tracking decisions for individuals at the margin
5Most studies that find positive effects of tracking on high ability students focus on special
programs for gifted children within a given type of school. Our context instead is one where
children are tracked into programs that are predominantly located at different types of schools
with different curricular and school leaving certificates. See Betts (2011) for a review on within
school tracking.
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(Dustmann et al., 2017), others conclude that early tracking tends to reduce ed-
ucational outcomes on average and for low SES students in particular (Hanushek
and Wössmann, 2006; Pekkala Kerr et al., 2013; Piopiunik, 2014; Schneeweis and
Zweimüller, 2014). Moreover, tracking can contribute to reduced social mobility,
i.e., by increasing the importance of parental background for educational or labor
market outcomes (Dustmann, 2004; Bauer and Riphahn, 2006; Brunello and Chec-
chi, 2007; Pekkarinen et al., 2009). Later tracking or a larger fraction of seats in
academic track programs on the other hand tend to improve educational outcomes
(Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2011; Guyon et al., 2012). The aim of this paper is
not to derive conclusions about structure of the education system as such. Instead,
similar to Carlana et al. (2017), we show that early tracking can lead to mismatch
that can reinforce inequalities in a potentially unfair way, although our focus is not
on high achieving migrant students, but on low SES children in general.
Second, by showing that a mentoring intervention can improve track outcomes
and reduce inequality of opportunity, we contribute to a literature on interventions
or mentoring that aim to reduce socio-economic disparities in education. So far,
large-scale and long-term evaluations of RCTs targeted at elementary school chil-
dren are rare, mostly focused on in-school programs, and their evidence is mixed (for
an overview and discussion, see Kautz et al., 2014). In general, these programs seem
most effective in improving academic outcomes if they target social skills or better
relationships between children and parents (Hawkins et al., 2008; Sorrenti et al.,
2020). A wider literature exists on mentoring and in particular the Big Brothers
Big Sisters program (Foster, 2001; Eby et al., 2008; Moodie and Fisher, 2009; Ra-
posa et al., 2019). However, few of these studies conduct randomized evaluations.
Moreover, they focus almost exclusively on adolescent youths (see, e.g. Grossman
and Tierney, 1998). While some of these programs show positive effects in terms of
functioning in school or reduced dropout rates (Hawkins et al., 2005; Goux et al.,
2017) others display zero or adverse long-run effects (McCord, 1978; DuBois et al.,
2002; Rodriguez-Planas, 2012a). We confirm these findings to the extent that we
do not observe substantial program effects on academic performance in terms of
GPA. However, because the program sets in just before a critical decision-period,
its effects on child behaviors and parental decision-making are large enough for the
program to have long-run ramifications on children’s educational careers, reducing
the inequality of opportunity divide.6 In this sense, our results also relate to the
6Examples of other programs that focus on critical decision-points during educational careers
are Hoxby and Turner (2015) and Bettinger et al. (2012).
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discussion on social mobility and the intergenerational persistence of life outcomes
(Case et al., 2002; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Aizer and Currie, 2014).
Last, our work relates to a broad literature on programs and RCTs that can
help improve the lives of disadvantaged children. A prominent example are (early)
childhood education or intervention programs (e.g., Currie, 2001; Heckman et al.,
2010; Fryer et al., 2015; Alan and Ertac, 2018; Attanasio et al., 2020; Cappelen
et al., 2020). Moreover, several evaluations have shown the effectiveness of initiatives
that explicitly aim at helping poor children gain opportunities (Chetty et al., 2016;
Oreopoulos et al., 2017). Finally, there exist several programs that focus on the
reduction of crime or other risky behaviors, some of which also display gains in
schooling outcomes (see, e.g., Heller et al., 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
the institutional background, recruitment, our measures, details of the mentoring
intervention, and its implementation. Section 3 first presents descriptive evidence on
prevailing SES gaps in high track attendance and deduces our main research question
regarding the program’s effect on children’s schooling trajectories and SES-related
inequalities of opportunity. Subsequently, it unveils the causal effect of mentoring on
high track attendance and provides suggestive evidence for underlying mechanisms.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Data
This section describes the German education system, the briq family panel data,
and the concept of the mentoring intervention. We start out by explaining the
German school system and the procedures of early tracking. Then, in section 2.2,
we provide details on the sample and data collection, how we classified families in
terms of SES, and how children were randomly assigned to three groups: control low
SES, treatment low SES, and control high SES. Section 2.3 describes all relevant
measures and variables and section 2.4 describes the mentoring intervention.
2.1 Institutional background
Children enter school at age six and then stay for four years of general elementary
school education.7 These elementary schools tend to be homogeneous in quality and
are predominantly public or publicly financed (more than 90% of students attend
7Exact rules may slightly vary across time and federal state. We describe the system as it
applies to children in our sample.
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schools that are free of charge). Education there takes place in classes of around
21 children (Baumann et al., 2012) with a single head teacher who teaches all main
subjects (German, Math, English).
After grade four, usually at the age of ten, students transition from primary
school to a secondary school program. These programs differ in (academic versus
vocational) content, length (5 to 9 years), and type of degree certificate that can be
obtained. We classify these programs into “high track” and “low track” programs
whereby only the high track leads to an upper secondary school degree, one that
qualifies them for higher education studies. The high track lasts mostly nine years
and the type of education prepares students for tertiary studies at academic insti-
tutions such as four-year colleges or five-year universities. The low track lasts five
to six years and the school content is mostly vocational, i.e., preparing students for
an apprenticeship.8
Track choice determines the type of classroom experience a child receives dur-
ing grades five to ten (less than 2% of students switch tracks during that time,
Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2017b).
Overall educational expenditures are five percent higher in the high track and teach-
ers receive 13-14% higher gross pay (Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung des
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2017a; German Statistical Office, 2016). Moreover,
high track students are taught around 10% more hours and the breadth and in-
tensity of academic subjects is substantially larger. They are also surrounded by
better performing peers, as performance of high versus low track students in the
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test differs by more than
one standard deviation (see, Dustmann et al. (2017) for a more detailed discussion
of track differences).
There is no strict grade cutoff or central examination to determine which track
children attend after elementary school. Instead, the institutional setting stipulates
a two-stage decision process that involves both teachers and parents. In a first
instance, all children receive a written teacher track recommendation on their mid-
term transcript of grade four. This recommendation is based on the evaluation
of a child’s performance and abilities by the student’s head teacher and by other
teachers, if applicable. The teacher recommendation is thus a clear and transparent
evaluation of a child’s abilities and an important signal to the parents. Then, in
a second instance, usually in February/March of grade 4, parents select secondary
schools based on the teacher recommendation and their own assessment, aspirations,
and preferences (see figure A3 for a timeline of the decision-process). Importantly,
8Appendix B.1 describes the classification of school programs.
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in this second step, parents can choose freely between both types of secondary
school programs and schools are not allowed to select students based on ability or
prior performance.9 While the education system allows for later track-reversals (see,
e.g., Tamm (2008); Dustmann et al. (2017)), initial track choices tend to be highly
predictive of final education outcomes in particular among low SES children (Biewen
and Tapalaga, 2017; Glaesser and Cooper, 2011).
2.2 Sample
The briq family panel comprises children born between 09/2002 and 08/2004 from
the regions of Bonn and Cologne (Germany) who were contacted using official reg-
istry data.10 To enter our study all families had to respond to an initial contact
letter by returning a questionnaire about the socio-economic characteristics of the
household. They also had to express interest in taking part in the mentoring pro-
gram and accompanying interviews. For a more detailed description of the recruiting
procedure see Appendix B.2 and Falk and Kosse (2020).
Based on the initial screening questionnaire, families were classified as high or
low SES. Low SES families meet at least one of the following three criteria. First, low
income describes families whose equivalence household income is lower than the 30th
percentile of the German income distribution (1,065 Euro monthly net household
equivalence income).11 Second, in low education families neither the mother nor the
father of the child have obtained a high track school degree, i.e., which qualifies for
university studies. Third, single parent families are households where the child’s
primary caregiver is not living together with a partner. Households for which none
of the three criteria apply are classified as high SES.
Low SES households were the target group of the mentoring program and our
randomized control trial. We therefore invited all low SES families to take part in
9This rule of free ability-independent parental track choice is written into state law, and strictly
enforced. Schools may give priority on the basis of the following criteria only: siblings, gender ratio,
balancing of native and non-native speakers, distance to school, lottery. In practice, most schools
give priority to siblings and then use a lottery to choose among all other applicants (Ministerium
and des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen für Schule und Bildung, 2017).
10Invitations to take part in the mentoring program and the interviews were sent to all families
with children born between 09/2003 and 08/2004 and to one-third of the families with children
born between 09/2002 and 08/2003. Birth dates were chosen such that children of the younger
cohort were typically in second grade.
11 As a reference, we make use of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 2011), a
representative sample of the German population consisting of more than 20,000 individuals in more
than 10,000 households. For details see (Wagner et al., 2007). Equivalence income is computed
according to the procedure used by the OECD and EUROSTAT (see Hagenaars et al., 1994). The
resulting poverty threshold is (approximately) equivalent to the official poverty threshold, which
in Germany is computed relative to the median income (e.g., 1,033 Euro in the year 2015).
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the interviews. To be eligible for treatment, they had to participate in the baseline
interviews and experiments (Fall 2011) and to provide written consent to allow the
transmission of their addresses to the organization running the mentoring program
(Balu und Du e.V.). Written consent could be given during the interview or be
sent by postal mail thereafter. Out of 590 eligible families, 212 were randomly
selected and form the intention-to-treat (ITT) group (Treatment Low SES). The
remaining 378 form the control group (Control Low SES). We used stratified random
treatment assignment to ensure a proportional representation of all forms of pre-
defined disadvantage (low income, low education, single parenthood) in the ITT
group, while making sure that the number of selected children matched the local
supply of mentors.12 After realization of the baseline interviews, contact information
of the treatment group children was transmitted to the organization running the
program (Balu und Du e.V.). As a second control group we also invited (in the same
period) 150 randomly chosen high SES families (among those who had answered
the information letter) to take part in the study (Control High SES). To ensure
comparability we also asked them to give written consent to allow the transmission
of their addresses to the organization running the mentoring program. 122 families
took part at baseline and gave written consent. All families who had participated
in the pre-treatment data collection were invited to take part in the post-treatment
data collection and yearly follow-up data collections, for details see Appendix B.2.
Our working sample consists of all children for whom we have information about
track attendance in grade 5. We also require information about track choice and a
basic set of control variables (see section 2.3) to be non-missing. This leaves us with
a final sample of 495 children.13 At baseline, children where on average 7.8 years old
and attended grade 2 or 3. In the analyses, we use data from parents and children
collected between the end of 2011 (baseline) and the end of 2018 (6-year follow-up)
when children were in grade 9 or 10. At each data collection point, parents and
children were interviewed by trained interviewers who followed a rigorous protocol
(see Appendix B.2 for details).
12The combination of the three forms of disadvantage and two regions yields 14 strata. Given
the larger relative supply of mentors in Bonn, we also assigned a higher share of children in Bonn
to the ITT group. Therefore, assignment into treatment was random conditional on region of
residence.
13Attrition across data collections is non-selective in a sense that attrition is neither different
across treatment groups (p = 0.765, two-sample test of proportions) nor does it relate to the
interaction of baseline GPA and treatment status (see table A2 and section 3.3 for a discussion).
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2.3 Variables and measures
In each interview phase, the children’s mothers completed an extensive questionnaire
covering their socio-economic background, information about school choice, as well
as child school performance.
2.3.1 School choice
School type From the mother questionnaires, we derive information about the
type of secondary school a child is attending. Education programs which lead to an
upper secondary school degree that qualify for university studies (German Abitur)
are classified as “high track”. All other programs are classified as “low track”. The
German school system and the degree to which high and low track programs differ
in quality are described in section 2.1.14
Teacher recommendation At the end of primary school, all parents receive a
teacher recommendation regarding the most suitable track type for their child.15 See
section 2.1 for a description of the track choice process. The recommendation was
elicited using the mother questionnaires in 2014. We generate a dummy variable
which equals one if a child received a recommendation for the high track, and zero
otherwise.
2.3.2 Child school performance
Elementary school GPA Grades at the end of the school year in German and
mathematics were reported by the mothers. Since children are in secondary schools,
we also elicited the child’s grade in the first foreign language (usually English). In the
German grading system, grades range from one to six where lower grades indicate
better performance. Grade point average (GPA) is the equally weighted score of
grades in German and mathematics when the children are still in elementary school.
From secondary school onward, GPA also comprises the final grade in the first
foreign language. For ease of interpretation we transform GPA, such that higher
values indicate better performance. In the analysis we use the variable “elementary
school GPA” as control variable. It is calculated as the average of the GPAs in the
respective years of elementary school.
14See Appendix B.1 for details on the German secondary school system and an exact description
of the tracking classification.
15Children have one head teacher during elementary school (teaching all main subjects) and this
teacher usually consults with other teachers (e.g., teaching religion or sports) and the headmaster
before giving a recommendation.
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2.4 The mentoring intervention
The intervention that we implemented and evaluate is a well-established non-profit
mentoring program called “Balu und Du” (German for “Baloo and you”). In this
program, elementary school children are provided with a mentor for the duration
of one year. The mentors, called Baloos, are university students (age 18 to 30)
who typically spend one afternoon per week one-on-one with their mentees, called
Mowglis. The conceptual idea of the program is for the mentors to act as friends and
“big buddies” who encourage the acquisition of new ideas and skills by enriching the
social environment of the children.16 In addition to being pedagogically good role
models, mentors tend to be more educated than the children’s regular caregivers.
In our sample, all mentors have obtained a high track degree and are currently
enrolled at university. Thus, they may act as motivators and informants, e.g., about
the schooling system and benefits of high track attendance.17
The mentoring program “Baloo and you” is embedded in a professional structure.
On a weekly basis, mentors complete an online diary in which they report the
activities that they have engaged in, as well as potential problems of the mentor-
child relationship. Program coordinators read and comment on these diaries, and
provide support. These coordinators are trained and paid professionals in education
science or psychology and they provide supervision and advice to mentors. They
also organize bi-weekly monitoring meetings where mentors receive suggestions for
activities with the mentored child and discuss potential problems.18
We transmitted household addresses of all randomly-selected families to the men-
toring organization. The actual matching process of mentor and mentee is part of
the program and was conducted by the organization. Each child in the ITT group
could potentially be matched, but not all selected children were effectively matched
with a mentor. A mentor-mentee match was successfully implemented for 72% of
the ITT group children. For 28% of the children, matches could not be realized due
to a local shortage of mentors, mentor refusals or coordination problems between
16For further details, see Müller-Kohlenberg and Drexler (2013) and Kosse et al. (2020).
17The program is similar to many existing programs in the US and abroad. Examples are Big
Brother/Big Sister, College Mentors for Kids, Friends of the Children, Mentoring USA and SHINE
mentoring (Grossman and Tierney, 1998; Moodie and Fisher, 2009). However, most of these other
programs tend to focus on teenagers (see Foster, 2001; Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2012b; Kautz et al., 2014,
for reviews).
18The program has been honored with several public awards, e.g., by the Robert Bosch Foun-
dation in 2011 and the federal government of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) in 2006. More
details about the mentoring program can be found on www.balu-und-du.de and in an overview
article by Müller-Kohlenberg and Drexler (2013).
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mentors and families (e.g., pregnancy of the mentor, moving of mentor or family).
Most of these children were never contacted by the organization.
3 Results
In this section, we first provide descriptive evidence on the (in)equality of opportu-
nity divide, prevailing as Control High SES children are more likely to attend the
high track in the year after tracking (grade five) than similarly performing Control
Low SES children. Section 3.2 then describes the causal short and long-term effects
of mentoring on the schooling decision. Here we also provide suggestive evidence on
the program’s effect in terms of child engagement at school and parental decision-
making, respectively. Last, we provide the results from a substantial number of
robustness analyses. This includes tests for baseline balance and the absence of
selective attrition, an assessment of the external validity of our results, and local
average treatment effect estimates.
For most analyses, we use data from the 2-year follow-up data collection, cor-
responding to the point in time when all children have transitioned to secondary
school (N = 495). However, to study long-run effects of the intervention on educa-
tional trajectories, we extend our analysis up to the most recent wave of interviews
(6-year follow-up) when children are in grade 9 or 10, i.e., five years after tracking
(N = 479).
3.1 The (in)equality of opportunity divide
Research suggests a strong association between parental socio-economic status and
the first schooling transition in Germany (e.g., Dustmann, 2004; Bauer and Riphahn,
2006; Biewen and Tapalaga, 2017). This is also apparent in our data. The estimates
in column 1 of table 1 stem from a linear probability model of high track attendance
on a dummy variable for high SES. They reveal that children from high SES back-
grounds are 31.1 percentage points, or 63.7 percent, more likely to attend the high
track (N = 350) after the schooling transition (p < 0.01).
While this raw gap is a meaningful description of socioeconomic inequalities in
transition probabilities, it does not necessarily depict unfair access to educational
opportunities. Instead, high SES children might simply be rewarded for working
harder. They might also be more skillful, in part, because they benefit from better
initial endowments or parental inputs, due to the “accident of birth” (Smith et al.,
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1997; Sirin, 2005; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Heckman, 2008).19 Such differences
in effort or skill naturally affect school performance. In our sample, they result in
40 percent of a standard deviation higher GPA among high SES children (see table
A3).20 Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in GPA then translates into a
24 percent higher probability of attending the high track during the year after the
transition (table A4).
High track attendance
in 5th grade in 9/10th grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean low SES: 0.488 0.508
High SES dummy 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.217*** 0.373*** 0.374*** 0.290***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
GPA (elementary) No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 350 350 350 342 342 342
R-squared 0.076 0.088 0.303 0.115 0.128 0.271
Table 1: SES gaps at the point of tracking and at the end of secondary schooling.
Coefficients are OLS estimates using location FEs with White robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively.
In addition to looking at raw SES gaps in transition probabilities, we thus also
investigate gaps net of school performance differences. By eliminating differences
due to (righteous) effort and (potentially tilted) skill levels, they can be seen as a
lower bound measure of prevailing unfairness in the access to academic education.21
The results displayed in columns 2 and 3 of table 1 reveal that age and sex hardly
affect the estimated high SES coefficient (column 2), while elementary school GPA
reduces it (column 3). Yet, performance differences account for only less than one
third of the gap in high track attendance between Control High SES and Control
Low SES children. This finding is surprising and reveals a high level of inequality
of opportunity. It indicates that the educational career of a child seems to be more
19See also Schwippert et al. (2003) for evidence on skill differences in Germany.
20Assuming that grading is non-discriminatory against low SES children. See Alesina et al.
(2018) for evidence on discrimination against immigrants.
21This relates to a larger literature in sociology on primary (performance related) and secondary
(non-performance related) effects in educational decision-making (see, e.g., Jackson et al., 2007;
Kloosterman et al., 2009; Neugebauer, 2010) going back to Boudon (1974).
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strongly determined by her parents’ socioeconomic resources than by her own efforts
and abilities.22
Do the above-described unconditional and conditional SES gaps have long-run
ramifications? When looking at educational trajectories until adolescence, we find
that both gaps increase over time. At the end of secondary school (grades nine/ten)
high SES children are overall 37.3 percentage points (versus 31.1 pp in grade five)
more likely to attend a high track program and 29 percentage points (versus 21.7 pp
in grade five) after accounting for elementary school performance (see columns 4 and
6 of table 1). This increase in socioeconomic inequality is in line with prior results
by, e.g., Biewen and Tapalaga (2017) who show that low SES children are much
less likely to transition to a high track program at later stages of secondary school
than high SES children. It suggests that unequal opportunities at early stages of the
educational career are enduring and particularly detrimental for low SES children.23
While socio-economic inequalities in access to educational opportunities are par-
ticularly salient in a situation characterized by early track choices and transparent
school differences, they are symptomatic of similar opportunity gaps across the world
(Corak, 2013; Carlana et al., 2017; Walters, 2018; Rothstein, 2019). As regards their
sources, a lack of access to high SES role models has been identified as an impor-
tant determinant of “opportunity gaps” faced by low SES children (Chetty et al.,
2016; Putnam, 2016). Favorable role models have the potential to increase a child’s
educational motivation and engagement (Rhodes et al., 2000) and can inform or
convince her parents about the feasibility and benefits of education (Cunha et al.,
2013; Boneva and Rauh, 2018). Following this line of thought, our hypothesis is that
access to a high SES mentor might increase the transition probability of low SES
children and reduce part of the above-described inequality of opportunity divide.
In the remainder of the paper, we thus address the following research question:
Can access to a highly educated mentor causally reduce the unconditional and con-
ditional SES gaps in access to education? Our aim is to unveil the causal effect of
22Our sampling scheme allows us to take a closer look at transition probabilities within groups
of low SES children that differ by type of socio-economic disadvantage (low income, low education,
single parent). Because these groups are non-exclusive and many children face multiple forms
of disadvantage, we estimate a model with three indicators as explanatory variables. Findings
indicate that the inequality of opportunity divide is almost exclusively driven by children who
grow up in low income and low parental education families (see table A5), while children from
single parent families are hardly disadvantaged.
23While startling, these gaps are no larger in our sample than in the general population of
children. Using representative SOEP-data for 17 year-old children, we find an SES gap of 35.1
percentage points (p < 0.01). Moreover, these representative findings mirror our data as differences
are almost exclusively driven by children from low-income and low parental education families (see
table A6).
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mentoring on children’s educational trajectories both in the short run and in the
longer run, and to provide suggestive evidence on the effect of mentoring on children
and parents, respectively.
3.2 The causal effect of mentoring on schooling decisions
Panel A of figure 1 displays the effect of the mentoring program on tracking outcomes
among Treatment Low SES children and the extent to which these children catch
up with the High SES Control group. Right after the transition (grade five), the
Treatment Low SES children are 11 percentage points (21.7 percent) more likely to
attend the high track than those from the Low SES control group (p < 0.05, see
table A7 column 1). The treatment thus closes about one third of the unconditional
31 percentage point gap between the Control Low SES and the Control High SES
groups (see also section 3.1).24 In terms of magnitude this effect is sizable; it is
about twice as large as the effect of being roughly one year older at school entry
(i.e., of being born just before as opposed to just after the school entry age cutoff,
see Dustmann et al., 2017) and nearly as large as the associative impact of a 0.5 sd
increase in GPA (see table A4).
Does the interaction with a highly educated mentor also reduce the performance-
adjusted SES gap? Results displayed in Panel B of table 1 suggest that this is indeed
the case. When comparing the bars in the top part of panel B, two main findings
emerge. First, the estimated effect size of the mentoring program remains the same
after controlling for basic demographic characteristics and elementary school GPA
(0.110, p < 0.05), while its precision increases. This finding confirms that treatment
assignment within the low SES group of children was independent of school per-
formance. Second, participation in the mentoring program closes roughly one half
of performance-adjusted SES gap, reducing it from 21.7 percentage points to 11.2
percentage points.
24See section 3.3 for robustness analyses.
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Figure 1: Panel A displays the fraction of children who attend the high track in 5th
grade by treatment assignment category. Error bars reflect standard errors. Results
correspond to a linear probability model with location FEs. Panel B displays
unconditional and conditional SES gaps and treatment effects (ITT) in high track
attendance in grades 5 and 9/10. Unconditional gaps are estimated differences
without further controls. Conditional gaps are estimated differences conditional on
GPA in elementary school, sex and age. Details regarding the SES gap in grade 5
are shown in table 1 (columns 1 and 3), details regarding the treatment effect in
5th grade are shown in table A7 (columns 1 and 3), details regarding the SES gap
in 9/10th grade are shown in table 1 (columns 4 and 6), and details regarding the
treatment effect 5 years after tracking are shown in table A8 (columns 1 and 3). ∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
We now turn to the important question of whether mentoring can improve chil-
dren’s educational trajectories and well-being also in the longer run. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the most important rationale for sending low SES children to
a low track program among both teachers and parents is the concern that difficult
material and high work load might lead to distress in the medium and longer term.
One worry is that children with lower educational resources at home might have
to repeat a grade or be “down-tracked” after a while, leaving them with a sense of
failure. This is, however, not what we find. Instead, the results displayed in the
bottom part of panel B in figure 1 suggest that the treatment effect is enduring and
of about equal size (point estimate of 0.104, p < 0.05) even five years after tracking.
Figure A4 indicates that not only the treatment effect is persistent over time, but
also the levels of high track attendance in treatment and control groups. Moreover,
the treatment effect remains almost exactly the same (0.103, p < 0.05) in terms of
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size and significance even after we control for age, sex and elementary school grades
(see table A8). Overall, the program closes more than one-third of the long-run
performance-adjusted SES gap (see bars at the bottom of panel B).
We proceed by investigating the dynamics of track attendance between the 5th
and 9/10th grade to evaluate whether this long-term effect is indeed driven by the
same children who benefited from the mentoring program in terms of their school
track choice after grade four. Figure A5 displays the probability of being tracked up,
tracked down, and of having to repeat a grade in the treatment and control groups,
respectively. The figure illustrates two important findings. First, it is relatively
uncommon that initial track choices are reversed between grades 5 and 9/10 (see
the left and middle panels). As a consequence, the initial decision after grade four
is highly predictive of the type of education low SES children receive during the
ages 10-16.25 Second, track reversals and grade retention are equally likely in the
treatment and control groups, suggesting that those children who attend the high
track because of the mentoring program are no more likely to experience failure.
Arguably, these findings do not exclude the possibility that children in the treatment
group experience higher levels of stress, e.g., due to lower grades. However, we
again find no evidence of this presumption. The effects on GPA are small and not
significantly different from zero (see the results in table A9). Moreover, there are
no adverse effects in terms of school enjoyment: differences in school satisfaction (“I
enjoy going to school”) between children in the Low SES Treatment and Control
groups are small and non-significant (see table A10). However, overall, children
in high track programs display 30 percent of a standard deviation higher school
enjoyment than those in low track programs.
In the following, we zoom into the decision-making process to obtain a better
understanding of the program’s impacts. Decision-making about track attendance
involves three types of actors: The child, whose academic potential is being eval-
uated; the head teacher, who has known the child for several years and who gives
a track recommendation assessing her long-run academic potential; and the par-
ents, who are the legal decision-makers. As mentoring takes place in the household
context, it only affects children and parents.26 The effect on the child is likely to
manifest itself mainly through a better teacher recommendation, which above and
beyond grades, reflects an assessment of the child’s potential and motivation to suc-
ceed in a high track program. The effect on the parents is likely to manifest itself in
25See Biewen and Tapalaga (2017); Glaesser and Cooper (2011) for prior evidence showing that
initial tracking strongly determines final education outcomes.
26As a rule, teachers were not informed about the program, but the possibility exists that children
talked about their mentors at school.
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their decision-making after having received the teacher’s recommendation. To pro-
vide suggestive evidence on the relative effect of the program on children and their
parents, we provide a simple nonparametric decomposition of the overall treatment
effect, dissecting it into program-induced changes in teacher recommendations and
parental decision-making (see Appendix C for details). We find that roughly one
third of the overall effect can be ascribed to the positive impact of the mentors on
the children and the resulting changes in teacher recommendations. Approximately
two-thirds of the program effect are due to changes in parental decision-making (see
figure C1). Thus, the program seems to encourage low SES children to strive at
school, which results in better teacher recommendations. However, it also seems
to induce low SES parents to behave more like high SES parents in that they in-
creasingly follow a high teacher recommendation and are more inclined to overrule
a low one. As both effects contribute to the reported SES gaps (see Appendix D
on SES differences in teacher recommendations and parental decision-making), and
are mitigated by the treatment, this brings our findings to full circle.
3.3 Robustness checks and local average treatment estimates
The aim of this section is to assess the robustness and external validity of our results,
and to present alternative treatment estimates. We start by investigating baseline
imbalance. Then, to assess systematic attrition, we discuss results based on weights
or treatment-effect bounds that account for the probability of being lost to follow-
up. Additionally, we present evidence based on representative population weights
to appraise the external validity of our results. Last, we discuss compliance and
present local average treatment effects using random treatment assignment as an
instrument for program take-up.
A potential concern for the validity of our estimates is whether the randomization
procedure indeed yielded observationally equivalent treatment and control groups.
In this respect, an important feature of our study design is that we have also collected
measures of academic performance (school grades) before treatment assignment.
Using these data, we can show that the randomization procedure was successful:
pre-treatment GPA is not associated with treatment status (coefficient of -0.002,
see column 1 of table A2).
A second potential limitation for the interpretation of randomized intervention
studies is selective attrition. In our case, one may worry that study participation in
later data collections systematically relates to treatment status, which would bias
our estimates. Moreover, treatment status might differentially affect attrition among
19
high or low performing students. In columns 2 and 3 of table A2, we provide esti-
mates of the probability to being lost to follow-up as a function of treatment status
and GPA. The results indicate that attrition in grade 5 and 9/10, respectively, are
not related to treatment assignment nor to its interaction with GPA. The treatment
effects thus prove remarkably robust to potential selective attrition. In fact, the
results hardly change when we re-weigh the observed data using inverse probabil-
ities of participation in grade 5 and 9/10 (see table A11, columns 2 and 5, and
Appendix B.3.1 for details). Nevertheless, we further assess bias due to selective
attrition by estimating treatment effects using the trimming procedure suggested
by Lee (2009). Instead of correcting point estimates, this approach yields interval
estimates of effect sizes on the basis of extreme assumptions about selection. Given
the near absence of systematic attrition discussed above (compare table A2), it is
not surprising that the analysis yields tight bounds in line with previously reported
results. The Lee-bounds of the treatment effects are 0.104 to 0.112 for high track
attendance in grade 5 and 0.088 to 0.129 for high track attendance in grade 9/10,
respectively (see table A12).
The above suggests that our findings are robust and internally valid, but do
they generalize? Arguably, although the initial recruitment was based on official
registry data, families in our sample are not necessarily representative of the German
population. After all, any family taking part is low SES (in at least one dimension)
and declared interest in the mentoring program. Consequently, the reported effect
sizes constitute average effects of voluntary mentoring for low SES children. Other
types of policy-relevant effects are conceivable, however. For example, a universal
roll-out of the program might induce a much larger, representative pool of families to
participate. To assess the program’s external validity and its scalability to a wider
group of families, we construct representative population weights that account for
the probability of being part of our sample as a function of the three SES dimensions,
child elementary school GPA and its interaction (see Appendix B.3.2). This is
possible because we collected this information corresponding to the questions posed
to SOEP participants, a data set that is representative of the German population
at large. The reweighed ITT effects, displayed in columns 3 and 6 of table A11,
are very similar to the main effects displayed in columns 1 and 4. This provides
tentative evidence that ITT effects might be similar if the program was rolled out
to a (more) representative group of families.
So far, all presented program effects result from a comparison of education out-
comes between the respective treatment assignment groups. However, not all chil-
dren who were initially assigned to the Low SES Treatment group have actually
20
participated in the mentoring program. For 28% of the treatment children in our
sample, the mentor-mentee match was either not initiated due to a shortage of men-
tors or matches could not be realized due to moving, other coordination problems, or
refusals by mentors or families.27 The above-displayed effect is thus the intention-to-
treat effect, i.e., the average effect of informal mentoring during elementary school
if offered to interested low SES families on a voluntary basis. However, since the
mentoring program takes effect through successful participation, we provide the cor-
responding local average treatment effects (LATE), that is, the average effect among
the treatment compliers.28 Table A13 displays two-stage least squares (2SLS) esti-
mates that use the random assignment as an instrument for treatment receipt. In
line with a matching rate (compliance rate) of around 72%, the LATE amounts to
15 percentage points immediately after the transition and to 14 percentage points in
the long run, i.e., exceeding the ITT effect by about 38%. In terms of the equality
of opportunity divide, the causal local average treatment effect of the program thus
closes more than two-thirds of the short-run and more than half of the long-run
conditional SES gap.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has reported good and bad news. The bad news is that access to high
quality education not only depends on merit but also on a child’s socio-economic
background. Conditional on school performance prior to selection, children from
high SES background are significantly more likely to attend the high track than
their low SES counterparts. Given the importance of tracking for labor market and
many other outcomes later in life, this unfair selection reflects a substantial lack of
inequality of opportunity. What’s more, a system that discriminates along parental
background rather than merit is likely to be economically inefficient. The reason
is that many children’s potential will not be realized, and the benefits arising from
complementarities between skills and high quality education are not harnessed.
At the same time, childhood intervention programs can help level the playing
field. This is the good news the paper reports on. Our main result shows that
social programs, such as mentoring, can substantially raise disadvantaged children’s
27 In terms of observable characteristics, complier and non-complier children do not significantly
differ in any relevant dimension (see also Kosse et al., 2020, for a discussion).
28Among complier children the average number of meetings was 22.6 (sd 11.8) and the treatment
duration was 9.9 months (sd 4.3). Hence, there is considerable variation in treatment intensity.
This is however highly endogenous as children with more difficulties tend to see their mentors more
often and for a longer period of time.
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educational prospects. We find that the SES gap in high track attendance that arises
conditional on GPA, can be reduced by half. Children who receive support from a
high-skilled mentor and through a program designed to foster informal learning and
psycho-social development yield better assessments by teachers and the program
also raises confidence of parents in their children. Both effects contribute to the
higher likelihood of high track attendance among treated low SES students relative
to the control group. Importantly, these positive effects are lasting, and our data do
not suggest that treated children suffer from increased grade retention, worse grades
or less school enjoyment.
The nature of the discussed program has two features noteworthy from a pol-
icy perspective. First, it is fairly cost effective. The cost of a mentor-mentee pair
amounts to roughly 1,000 Euro in addition to a mentor’s opportunity cost of time.
This cost should be related to the expected economic benefits that arise from sub-
stantially higher labor market returns for children entering the high rather than
the low track. Of course, selection and general equilibrium effects will complicate a
precise estimate of costs and benefits. Even the most conservative estimate of the
benefits arising from higher expected life-time earnings, however, will easily exceed
the cost of the program. Moreover, mentoring disadvantaged children yields societal
benefits above and beyond economic returns. For example, Kosse et al. (2020) show
that treated children are significantly more prosocial than those in the control group.
Similarly, children participating in the mentoring program are found to be less likely
to lie than their control group counterparts (Abeler et al., 2020), a behavior clearly
beneficial from a society’s point of view.
Second, the value of a social program depends critically on its scalability. In
this respect, the mentoring program under study qualifies well. As of today, Baloo
and You has initiated 12,275 mentor-mentee pairs, is operating in 104 cities and is
steadily increasing its activity. Moreover, it is plausible that the reported effects
are at work in related programs that similarly foster relationships and role modeling
(e.g. Big Brother/Big Sister, College Mentors for Kids, Mentoring USA, SHINE
mentoring etc.). The low cost and informal nature of mentoring programs make it
relatively easy to further expand their activities. In light of our findings, this would
be for the better.
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Hanushek, E. and Wössmann, L. (2006), ‘Does educational tracking affect perfor-
mance and inequality? Differences-in-differences evidence across countries’, The
Economic Journal 116, 363–376.
Hawkins, J. D., Kosterman, R., Catalano, R. F., Hill, K. G. and Abbott, R. D.
(2005), ‘Promoting positive adult functioning through social development inter-
vention in childhood: Long-term effects from the Seattle Social Development
Project’, Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine 159(1), 25–31.
Hawkins, J. D., Kosterman, R., Catalano, R. F., Hill, K. G. and Abbott, R. D.
(2008), ‘Effects of social development intervention in childhood 15 years later’,
Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine 162(12), 1133–1141.
Heckman, J. J. (2008), ‘Schools, skills and synapses’, Economic Inquiry 46(3), 289–
324.
Heckman, J. J., Moon, S. H., Pinto, R., Savelyev, P. A. and Yavitz, A. (2010),
‘The rate of return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program’, Journal of Public
Economics 94(1-2), 114–128.
Heckman, J., Pinto, R. and Savelyev, P. (2013), ‘Understanding the mechanisms
through which an influential early childhood program boosted adult outcomes’,
American Economic Review 103(6), 2052–86.
Heller, S. B., Shah, A. K., Guryan, J., Ludwig, J., Mullainathan, S. and Pollack,
H. A. (2017), ‘Thinking, fast and slow? Some field experiments to reduce crime
and dropout in chicago’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(1), 1–54.
Hoxby, C. M. and Turner, S. (2015), ‘What high-achieving low-income students
know about college’, American Economic Review 105(5), 514–17.
26
Jackson, M., Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J. H. and Yaish, M. (2007), ‘Primary and
secondary effects in class differentials in educational attainment: The transition
to A-level courses in england and wales’, Acta Sociologica 50(3), 211–229.
Kautz, T., Heckman, J. J., Diris, R., Ter Weel, B. and Borghans, L. (2014), Fostering
and measuring skills: Improving cognitive and non-cognitive skills to promote
lifetime success. NBER Working Paper No. 20749.
Kloosterman, R., Ruiter, S., De Graaf, P. M. and Kraaykamp, G. (2009), ‘Parental
education, children’s performance and the transition to higher secondary edu-
cation: Trends in primary and secondary effects over five Dutch school cohorts
(1965–99)’, The British Journal of Sociology 60(2), 377–398.
Kosse, F., Deckers, T., Pinger, P., Schildberg-Hörisch, H. and Falk, A. (2020), ‘The
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Tracking in OECD countries
Country Grade Country Grade
Austria 4 Israel 9
Germany 4 Japan 9
Czech Republic 5 South Korea 9
Ireland 6 Latvia 9
Luxembourg 6 Portugal 9
Mexico 6 Slovak Republic 9
Netherlands 6 Slovenia 9
Hungary 4/6/8 Spain 9
Belgium 8 Sweden 9
Italy 8 Switzerland 9
Lithuania 8 Australia 10
Poland 8 Chile 10
Turkey 8 Iceland 10
Denmark 9 New Zealand 10
Estonia 9 Norway 10
Finland 9 United Kingdom 10
France 9 Canada No tracking
Greece 9 United States No tracking
Table A1: The table indicates after which school grade tracking takes place in the
respective country. Note: Quebec (Canada) tracks after grade 9.
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Assigned to treatment Lost to follow-up
Grade 5 Grade 9/10
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment dummy -0.013 0.005
(0.039) (0.041)
GPA (baseline, std.) -0.002 -0.046* -0.043*
(0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
GPA x Treatment Dummy -0.043 -0.010
(0.039) (0.041)
Restricted to low SES Yes Yes Yes
Observations 590 590 590
R-squared 0.000 0.020 0.011
Table A2: Checks for baseline balance and selective attrition. GPA is standardized
and higher values indicate better grades. In column (1), we test for baseline balance.
The dependent variable is one if a child was selected into the Treatment Low SES
group and zero if selected into the Control Low SES group. In columns (2) and (3),
we test for selective attrition. The dependent variable is one if a child is lost to
follow-up, i.e., did not take part in the grade 5 or grade 9/10 interviews, and zero
otherwise. Displayed coefficients are OLS estimates with White robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively.
Elementary school GPA (standardized)
(1) (2)
High SES dummy 0.390*** 0.396***
(0.109) (0.109)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes
Observations 350 350
R-squared 0.037 0.045
Table A3: SES gaps in elementary school GPA. Coefficients are OLS estimates using
location FEs with White robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample: low and
high SES control groups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively.
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High track attendance in 5th grade
(1) (2)
Elementary school GPA (standardized) 0.247*** 0.233***
(0.017) (0.018)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes
Observations 350 350
R-squared 0.252 0.293
Table A4: Elementary school GPA and high track attendance. Coefficients are OLS
estimates using location FEs with White robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sample: low and high SES control groups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent level, respectively.
High track attendance in 5th grade
(1) (2) (3)
Low income -0.183*** -0.181*** -0.134***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.040)
Low education -0.288*** -0.289*** -0.193***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Single parent -0.074 -0.069 -0.016
(0.044) (0.044) (0.039)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes Yes
GPA (elementary) No No Yes
Observations 350 350 350
R-squared 0.117 0.121 0.303
Table A5: Gaps by SES categories at the time of tracking. Coefficients are OLS
estimates using location FEs with White robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sample: low and high SES control groups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent level, respectively.
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High track attendance at age 17
(SOEP, 10/11th grade)
(1) (2)
High SES dummy 0.351***
(0.021)
Low income dummy -0.111***
(0.022)
Low education dummy -0.354***
(0.022)




Table A6: SES gaps at age 17 in the SOEP (grade 10/11). Coefficients are OLS
estimates with White robust standard errors in parentheses. Track attendance is
measured when participants are 17 years old, respectively. In the SOEP, track
attendance is not observable at an earlier point in time. The sample includes the
SOEP waves 2011-2018. All variables follow the definitions described in sections 2.2
and 2.3. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
High track attendance in 5th grade
(1) (2) (3)
Mean low SES: 0.488
Treatment dummy 0.110** 0.116** 0.110**
(0.052) (0.052) (0.047)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes Yes
GPA (elementary) No No Yes
Observations 399 399 399
R-squared 0.110 0.118 0.302
Table A7: Causal effect of mentoring on high track attendance. Coefficients are
OLS estimates using strata FEs with White robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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High track attendance in 9/10th grade
(1) (2) (3)
Mean low SES: 0.508
Treatment dummy 0.104** 0.110** 0.103**
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes Yes
GPA (elementary) No No Yes
Observations 383 383 383
R-squared 0.143 0.153 0.277
Table A8: Causal effect of mentoring on high track attendance in grade 9/10. Co-
efficients are OLS estimates using strata FEs with White robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respec-
tively.
GPA 4th grade GPA 5th grade GPA 9/10th grade
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment dummy -0.008 -0.154 -0.040
(0.103) (0.111) (0.111)
Conditional on track No Yes Yes
Observations 389 378 365
R-squared 0.101 0.104 0.077
Table A9: Effects on GPA. GPA is standardized by grade and higher values indicate
better grades. Coefficients are OLS estimates with White robust standard errors in
parentheses, using strata FEs. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level, respectively.
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“I enjoy going to school” (standardized)
Full sample Only low track Only high track
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High track 0.297*** 0.268**
(0.097) (0.111)
Overrule low recom. -0.045
(0.162)
Overrule high recom. -0.146
(0.174)
Treatment group 0.091 -0.007
(0.167) (0.138)
High SES 0.083 -0.015
(0.394) (0.137)
Observations 465 465 167 125 204 205
R-squared 0.022 0.024 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.003
Table A10: Enjoyment of schooling by groups and tracks. Coefficients are OLS
estimates using location FEs with White robust standard errors in parentheses.
Data collection at grade 8/9. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level, respectively.
High track attendance
in 5th grade in 9/10th grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment dummy 0.110** 0.106** 0.115* 0.104** 0.104** 0.107*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.052) (0.052) (0.063)
IPW: attrition No Yes No No Yes No
IPW: representative No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 399 399 399 383 383 383
R-squared 0.110 0.112 0.131 0.143 0.145 0.166
Table A11: High track attendance in grade 5 and 9/10. Coefficients are OLS esti-
mates using strata FEs with White robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse
probability weights (IPW) are used to check for biases due to (potential) selective
attrition and (potential) non-representative SES distributions, details are provided




Grade 5 bounds Grade 9/10 bounds
Lower Upper Lower Upper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Dummy 0.104 0.112 0.088 0.129
Number of obs. 590 590 590 590
Number of selected obs. 399 399 383 383
Table A12: Treatment effect bounds for high track attendance at grade 5 and grade
9/10. The bounds are estimated using the trimming procedure suggested by Lee
(2009), using the implementation by Tauchmann (2014). Displayed bounds are
weighted averages of location-specific bounds.
High track attendance
in 5th grade in 9/10th grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LATE 0.152** 0.161** 0.152** 0.145** 0.153** 0.143**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.065) (0.072) (0.072) (0.067)
Controls:
Age & sex No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
GPA (elementary) No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 399 399 399 383 383 383
R-squared 0.088 0.094 0.281 0.134 0.144 0.268
Table A13: Local average treatment effect (LATE) analysis using random group as-
signment as instrument for actual treatment. Coefficients are two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimates using random assignment as an instrument for actual treatment,
using strata FEs. White robust standard errors in parentheses. In the sample in
columns (1)-(3), 105 of the 145 children who we intended to treat were actually
matched with a mentor. In the sample in column (4)-(6), 98 of the 137 children
who we intended to treat were actually matched with a mentor. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
37
Figure A1: Life satisfaction by track degree over the life-cycle. Kernel-weighted
local polynomial smoothing graph (bandwidth: 5 years) based on data of the SOEP
(2019). Life satisfaction is measured on a 11-point Likert scale. Average gap
amounts to 0.225 standard deviations (p < 0.01, using clustered SEs at the in-
dividual level, 525,712 observations of 67,828 individuals).
Figure A2: Subjective health by track degree over the life-cycle. Kernel-weighted
local polynomial smoothing graph (bandwidth: 5 years) based on data of the SOEP
(2019). Subjective health is measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Average gap
amounts to 0.355 standard deviations (p < 0.01, using clustered SEs at the in-






































Control Low SES Treatment Low SES
9/10th grade
High track attendance
Figure A4: The graph displays the fraction of children who attend the highest track
by treatment assignment category in grade 5 and 9/10. Error bars reflect standard
errors. Results correspond to a linear probability model, for details see table A11.


























Dynamics of track attendance between 5th and 9/10th grade
Figure A5: Long-run results: dynamics & grade retention. Error bars reflect stan-
dard errors. Results correspond to a linear probability models, using strata FEs.
Displayed numbers indicate the differences between the two groups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate




In Germany, all students jointly go to elementary school for at least four years.
After elementary school, usually at age 10, students enter one of several secondary
education programs. Education programs which lead to an upper secondary school
degree, i.e., that qualify for university studies (German Abitur) are labeled “high
track”. Programs that award degrees which do not qualify for university studies are
classified as “low track”.29 Children are categorized as high track students if they
attend:
• Upper secondary school (Gymnasium, grades 5-12 or 13). This school type
prepares students for university studies and awards them with an upper sec-
ondary school certificate (the Abitur) which allows them to enroll at university.
• “Advanced courses” in comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule). Comprehensive
schools award several school leaving degrees. During the course of attending
comprehensive schools students are, based on previous performance, succes-
sively sorted into basic and advanced courses. Attending advance courses in
most subjects and having good grades allows students to attend an upper-
secondary-program in grades 11 to 13 and gain an upper secondary school
certificate (Abitur). The exact rules and details are determined by law, the
so called “Ausbildungs- und Prüfungsordnung Sekundarstufe I” (APO-S I). In
grade 5, we label comprehensive school students as being on the high track if
their grades allow them to attend advanced courses in the following years. In
grade 9/10 students are labeled as being on the high track if they attend at
least three advanced courses and have good grades, i.e., allowing them to at-
tend the upper-secondary-program in grades 11 to 13 leading up to the Abitur
(see APO-S I).
B.2 Data collection
Recruiting Using official registry data we obtained more than 95% of the ad-
dresses of families living in the German cities of Bonn and Cologne who had chil-
dren of ages seven to nine when the study started (October 2011). Offers to take
29These programs include lower and intermediate secondary schools (Hauptschule and Re-
alschule), schools for children with special needs (Sonderschule) and comprehensive schools (basic
course program). Seven students are not categorized as they attend schools with special pedagog-
ical concepts without tracking.
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part in the study were sent to all families with children born between 09/2003 and
08/2004 and to one third of the families with children born between 09/2002 and
08/2003. Dates were chosen such that children of the younger cohort were typically
in second grade. In summer 2011, families were informed via postal mail about the
study, including two waves of interviews and, in particular, the potential partici-
pation in a mentoring program. Parents were informed that participation in the
mentoring program was not guaranteed due to limited capacity. If families were in-
terested in participating and if their children were fluent in German, they were asked
to sign a non-binding letter of intent to take part in the interviews and the men-
toring program, and to send back a short questionnaire concerning socio-economic
characteristics of the household.
Interviews Before and after the intervention, children and their mothers were
interviewed by trained interviewers according to the same protocol. For pre- and
post-treatment data collections, interviews took place in central locations in either
Bonn or Cologne, Germany. The interviews and experiments were conducted by
trained university students (mostly graduates) of psychology or education science.
From 2014 (2-year follow-up) onward, yearly interviews of the same families took
place at their homes. Interviews and experiments were conducted by experienced
and specially trained interviewers of TNS Infratest within the official framework of
the innovation sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP-IS) (Wagner
et al., 2007). At no point in time interviewers were informed about the purpose of
the study or the group assignment of the participating families (treatment/control
or high/low SES). The interviews and experiments were conducted according to a
detailed protocol. For participation in the interview, parents received 35 Euro in
the pre-treatment wave and 45 Euro in the following waves.
B.3 Robustness checks: weighting
B.3.1 Weighting scheme 1: attrition
Our core samples comprises all children for whom schooling information and espe-
cially track attendance in grade 5 (and in grade 9/10) are available. These comprise
70% (67%) of the baseline sample. In order to check for a potential bias by selec-
tive attrition related to treatment status and child school performance, we re-weight
the observed data using inverse probability weighting (IPW). Weights are estimated
from a Probit model of a binary selection indicator (indicating whether track in-
formation is available) regressed on treatment assignment and baseline GPA and
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their interaction. The re-weighted main results are displayed in table A11. As the
effects sizes are very similar to the unweighted effect sizes, we conclude that selective
attrition does not bias our results.
B.3.2 Weighting scheme 2: representative population
In order to assess the representativeness of our results, we compare our sample
to a representative sample of families in Germany. The comparison comprises of
all three dimensions of parental SES: income, education and single parent status,
as well as children’s elementary school GPA. As a reference, we make use of data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (Wagner et al., 2007). The SOEP
is comprised of yearly data on more than 20,000 individuals in more than 10,000
households. We compare the children in our sample with children in the same age-
range as in the SOEP (2019). In order to compare the samples along the SES
dimensions that we used in the sampling process, we elicited SES in the same way
as in the SOEP (for details, see section 2.2).
In order to check if deviations from representativeness, in terms of the SES dimen-
sions and child ability, affect our results, we re-weight our data based on propensity
scores that model the probability of being in our sample. For this purpose, we esti-
mate propensity scores based on a Probit model that includes dummies of all SES
dimensions, elementary school GPA and their interactions. The re-weighted main
results are displayed in table A11. The resulting effect sizes are very similar to those
from the unweighted regression, suggesting that selective participation does not bias
our results.
C A Decomposition of the Mentoring Effect
A child is observed in a high track program in grade 5 (h = 1) whenever one of the
following conditions holds:
(i) the child receives a high recommendation (r = 1) and and her parents adhere
to it (h = 1|r = 1) or
(ii) the child receives a low recommendation (r = 0) but her parents decide to
overrule (h = 1|r = 0) it.
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In the absence of the treatment, we can thus write the probability of being in the
high track in grade 5 as:
P (h = 1) = P (h = 1, r = 1) + P (h = 1, r = 0)
= P (h = 1|r = 1) ∗ P (r = 1) + P (h = 1|r = 0) ∗ P (r = 0)
Restricting the sample to low SES children, each of the above objects can be calcu-
lated from our data for the treatment and control groups (t = {0, 1}), respectively.
Then, taking finite differences with respect to the treatment yields:
∆τP (h = 1) = ∆τP (h = 1|r = 1) ∗ P (r = 1|t = 0) + P (h = 1|r = 1, t = 0) ∗∆τP (r = 1)
+∆τP (h = 1|r = 1) ∗∆τP (r = 1)
+∆τP (h = 1|r = 0) ∗ P (r = 0|t = 0) + P (h = 1|r = 0, t = 0) ∗∆τP (r = 0)
+∆τP (h = 1|r = 0) ∗∆τP (r = 0),
where ∆τ denotes the effect of treatment assignment, e.g., ∆τP (h = 1) = P (h =
1|t = 1) − P (h = 1|t = 0). After collecting terms, and since ∆τP (r = 0) =
−∆τP (r = 1), we can rewrite the overall intention to treat effect as being approxi-
mately equal to (i.e., disregarding the interaction effects):
∆τP (h = 1) ≈
child recommendation effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆τP (r = 1) ∗ [P (h = 1|r = 1, t = 0)− P (h = 1|r = 0, t = 0)]
+ ∆τP (h = 1|r = 1) ∗ P (r = 1|t = 0) + ∆τP (h = 1|r = 0) ∗ P (r = 0|t = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
parental decision effect
,
In line with the above, the overall effect can then be decomposed into two parts.
A part that reflects a change in children’s recommendations (child recommendation
effect) and a part that reflects a change in parental decision-making conditional on
track recommendation (parental decision effect).
Figure C1: Estimates of the decomposition as described in the above equation. The
bar represents the total treatment effect.
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High track High Recom. High in grade 5 given
in grade 5 low recom. high recom.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Low SES Control: 0.488 0.547 0.139 0.777
Treatment dummy 0.106** 0.057 0.038 0.096*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.060) (0.053)
Observations 399 399 173 226
R-squared 0.013 0.003 0.015 0.018
Table C1: Decomposition. Coefficients are OLS estimates using location FEs with
White robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1,
5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
We compute each of the above probabilities in our data and collect terms to obtain
the part of the program effect that can be ascribed to children (recommendation
effect) and parents (parental decision effect), respectively. Figure C1 displays the
results of this decomposition (estimates are shown in table C1). The dark gray bar
indicates that roughly one third of the effect on high track attendance arises due
to the positive impact of the mentor on the children and the resulting change in
teacher recommendations. Moreover, roughly two-thirds of the explained program
effect can be ascribed to the change in parental decision-making.
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D SES Differences and Opportunity Gaps at the
two Decision-Making Stages
Teacher recommendation Parental decision making
Recommendation High track High track
for high track given low recom. given high recom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean low SES: 0.547 0.139 0.777
High SES dummy 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.186*** 0.190 0.201* 0.197* 0.111** 0.112** 0.103*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.044) (0.121) (0.117) (0.114) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052)
GPA (std.) 0.258*** 0.073*** 0.138***
(0.019) (0.028) (0.037)
Additional controls:
Age & sex No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 131 131 131 219 219 219
R-squared 0.070 0.079 0.357 0.036 0.081 0.118 0.019 0.036 0.101
Table D1: The role of children’s recommendations and parental decisions. Coef-
ficients are OLS estimates using location FEs with White robust standard errors
in parentheses. GPA is the standardized elementary school GPA, coded such that
higher values indicate better performance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent level, respectively.
To unveil the extent to which the decision-making process translates into inequal-
ities of opportunity, this section displays socio-economic differences in children’s
recommendations and parental decision-making, respectively. The results in Table
D1 show SES differences at both decision-making stages. First, Control Low SES
children are overall 28.6 percentage points less likely to receive a high track recom-
mendation than Control High SES children. Moreover, this difference reduces by
35% to 18.6 percentage points after we control for child elementary school perfor-
mance. These findings again point towards discrimination against low SES children
as their parental background seems to weigh more heavily than school performance
for a high teacher recommendation. Besides, equality of opportunity differences pre-
vail also at the parental decision-making stage. As indicated in columns 4-9 of table
D1, low SES parents are about 20 percentage points less likely to overrule a low
recommendation (see columns 4-6) upwards. Moreover, they are around 10 percent-
age points less likely to follow along with a high recommendation (see columns 7-9),
indicating that some low SES parents choose the low track, although their children
have received high track recommendation. Throughout, child performance at school
seems largely unimportant for parental decision-making. This suggests that any dif-
ferences between the unconditional SES gap and the conditional SES gap observed
46
in figure 1 are driven by performance-induced changes in the teacher recommenda-
tion while parental decision-making seems largely insensitive to differences in child
school performance.
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